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The Logic of Contingent Work and 
Overwork
FLORA STORMER1*
In this article, I draw on institutional theory to propose that a 
macro-societal market logic is shaping our understanding of the 
workplace trends of contingent work and overwork. This logic, in 
combination with specific societal changes, affects how workers 
experience such trends. Yet paradoxically, the market logic can 
be used to both support and oppose the trends, resulting in a 
conceptual stalemate. Research implications are discussed.
Labour trends that have captured the attention of researchers and the 
general public in recent years include the rise of contingent work (Connelly 
and Gallagher, 2004; Winson and Leach, 2002; Van Dyne and Ang, 1998), 
and the escalation of overwork (Bunting, 2004; Schor, 1991). Both trends 
have been framed and discussed in the context of economic pressures 
related to capital mobility and globalization (Becker and Gerhart, 1996); 
organizations have been perceived as experiencing increased competitive 
pressures due to external forces, and these competitive pressures have in 
turn been realized in the workplace, contributing to the rise of contingent 
work and overwork.
Yet our very understanding of contingent work and overwork is being 
shaped by this economic framing, which occurs when these trends are 
understood through the lens of a macro-societal market logic. Winson and 
Leach (2002: 22) note that in regards to contingent work, “the content of 
[the imperatives of competitiveness and efficiency, two characteristics 
of a market logic] is rarely examined which is what makes them crucial 
in shaping public discourse.” Moreover, Kalleberg (1995) suggests that 
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when economic ideas are uncritically adopted by researchers, our research 
questions are effectively redefined.
At a basic level then, the adoption of a market logic in regards to 
contingent work and overwork has important consequences for how these 
trends are evaluated and addressed by researchers and policy makers, and 
for how workers themselves experience contingent work and overwork. In 
this paper, I use institutional theory to outline the general characteristics of 
a macro-societal market logic based on the concept of institutional logics. 
Second, I explore the concepts of contingent work and overwork, examining 
the changing context in which these trends are embedded. I conclude by 
discussing the theoretical and practical implications of applying a market 
logic to the trends of contingent work and overwork.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Institutional theory asks how institutions originate and change, and how 
institutions affect individual behaviour (Hall and Taylor, 1996). According 
to the theory, organizations become similar by following social rules in lieu 
of functional blueprints in order to be accepted as legitimate by others in 
the environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; 
Deephouse, 1996). Institutions are linked to action through institutional 
logics—the cultural beliefs, norms, and values that guide cognition, 
decisions, and behaviour (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Greenwood and 
Hinings, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Reay and Hinings, 2005). Logics are 
similar to interpretive schemes, which map our experience of the world. 
Shared interpretive schemes draw people together, create commitment and a 
sense of belonging, and shape how problems are defined (Bartunek, 1984). 
Institutional logics, like interpretive schemes, involve shared fundamental 
assumptions about why things happen the way they do (Ranson, Hinings 
and Greenwood, 1980).
Each institution has a corresponding institutional logic, and these logics 
can compete with and/or contradict each other. Many different kinds and 
“sizes” of institutions and logics cover a multitude of behaviours and social 
rules. This range in what “counts” as an institution can be thought of as an 
institutional hierarchy, where lower-order institutions and logics are nested 
in higher-order institutions and logics. For advanced Western societies, 
macro-societal institutions and logics represent the top of the institutional 
hierarchy. That is, though institutions and their logics appear from micro-
interpersonal to macro-societal levels of analysis (Dacin, Goodstein and 
Scott, 2002), logics ultimately stem from the higher-order institutional 
orders identified in Friedland and Alford’s (1991) inter-institutional system 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Friedland and Alford (1991) conceptualized 
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society as an inter-institutional system constructed through multiple 
institutional logics, defining institutions as “both supraorganizational 
patterns of activity by which individuals and organizations produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence and organize time and space [as well 
as] symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality, thereby rendering experience 
of time and space meaningful” (1991: 243). In other words, institutions 
restrict the means and ends of behaviour, giving actors their identities as 
well as vocabularies to explain their motives.
This hierarchical nature of institutions is revealed in organizational 
research, where lower-order institutions (such as organizational practices) 
are nested in higher-order institutions (organizations), which in turn are 
nested in even higher-order institutions (industries). In the same way, 
lower-order institutional logics are nested in successively higher-order 
logics. Lower-order institutions and logics are more amenable to change 
than higher-order institutions and logics because they are more accessible, 
circumscribed, and explicit; macro-societal institutions and logics at the 
top of the hierarchy tend to be so all-encompassing and taken for granted 
that they are almost invisible. Though these macro-societal institutions and 
logics represent fundamental cognitive categories and associated value sets 
based on relatively abstract ideas (the market, the family, etc.), they are 
accepted as basic realities in our daily lives. For example, we regularly 
participate in markets and count ourselves as members of families—yet we 
rarely ask why markets are structured as they are, or why we recreate the 
family structure from generation to generation. As Hegel noted, “Generally, 
the familiar, precisely because it is familiar, is not known.”
Friedland and Alford (1991) identified the top-level institutions or 
institutional orders of the contemporary capitalist West as the capitalist 
market, bureaucratic state, democracy, the nuclear family, and the Christian 
religion. All other institutions and logics of the contemporary capitalist 
West are nested within these macro-societal institutional orders. Friedland 
and Alford (1991: 256) maintained that the macro-societal institutions 
are contradictory but interdependent, and reasoned that a key task of 
social analysis is to understand the contradictions between these macro-
societal institutions and to “specify the conditions under which they shape 
organizational and individual action.”
A considerable number of organizational scholars are reporting broadly 
similar findings at the analytic level of organizational fields. (Fields exist 
one level of analysis down from the macro-societal level, and are “sets 
of organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute an area of institutional 
life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, 
and other organizations that produce similar services or products” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 64-65). These fields take shape through 
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mutual awareness and interaction among actors in the field, which creates 
patterns of organizational hierarchy and alliance.) For example, in the U.S. 
publishing industry, Thornton (2004) documented a shift in publishing-
house focus from being author-and-editor driven to being profit-driven. 
In the legal profession, Wallace (1999: 801) reported concern about the 
profit-driven focus associated with the practice of law, “characterized by 
a shift away from a focus of helping clients as a service profession with 
collegial relations among lawyers, to an emphasis on competition among 
lawyers, maximized billing of clients and, in short, making profit.” Cooper 
et al. (1996: 625) documented a shift among Canadian law firms from a 
Professional Partnership archetype to a Managerial Professional Business 
archetype, where the latter is “based on a set of values which are becoming 
organized into a coherent interpretive scheme about the professional service 
firm as a business.” In the health care sector, Ruef and Scott (1998) reported 
that the dominant logic in hospitals has shifted from “providing collective 
goods” to “profit maximization”, while in Alberta, Reay and Hinings (2005) 
reported a shift from “medical professionalism” to “business-like health 
care”. In the U.S. mutual fund industry, Lounsbury and Leblebici (2004: 68) 
explained that where the trustee logic valued “fiduciary responsibility and 
a conservative orientation towards wealth preservation” through personal 
service to shareholders, “...over time, this conceptualization of mutual funds 
as a service eroded and was replaced by the notion that they were products 
to be bought and sold in an anonymous marketplace.”
These broadly similar findings suggest that a macro-societal market 
logic is being assimilated across a wide range of organizational fields. 
Market logic assimilation occurs when institutional logics associated with 
lower levels of analysis (the organizational field, the organization, its 
units and its members) take on the flavour of the macro-societal logic of 
the market, losing their distinctiveness. Yet how assimilation plays out at 
different levels of analysis is specific to the institutional structures that exist 
at each level of analysis (e.g., Giaimo and Manow, 1999).
Friedland and Alford (1991) identified the macro-societal institution of 
the market in advanced Western societies as the capitalist market and its 
logic as accumulation and the commodification of human activity. Though 
competing perspectives on the characteristics of capitalism exist (two, 
for example, are Keynesian economics versus neoclassical economics), 
neoclassical economic theory is widely understood to be dominant in 
capitalist thought (Granovetter, 1985; Lee, 2004; Kalleberg, 1995). I 
therefore define the macro-societal logic of the market as a capitalist market 
logic characterized by a neoclassical economic perspective.
Neoclassical economic theory represents a set of ideas based largely 
on Adam Smith’s work in The Wealth of Nations. These ideas and 
347THE LOGIC OF CONTINGENT WORK AND OVERWORK
corresponding assumptions comprise a macro-societal market logic and 
have been expanded on by Perrow (1986) and Galbraith (1987) as follows: 
The individual, rather than the group, structure, or culture, is the unit of 
analysis. Individuals are motivated by self-interest, and following one’s self-
interest serves the common interest. Individuals try to rationally obtain the 
most of what they value in light of their self-interest (maximizing utility). 
The market consists of many small firms competing with each other for 
buyers. These small firms are unable to influence market prices. Buyers 
choose whether or not to enter or exit the market. Workers choose whether 
or not to work in the market. A buyer’s choice of seller depends on the 
availability of high quality information about sellers and their products and/
or services. A worker’s choice of employer depends on the availability of 
high quality information about employers and their policies. The market 
system is regulated by competition among sellers. Prices for goods and 
services are set through competition. Because the market is regulated by 
competition, little government regulation is required. Both competition 
and the market system should be as widespread as possible (an argument 
for free trade). Both individuals and organizations value efficiency. 
Efficiency is realized through rising productivity (making more with less) 
and evidenced by rising profits. Market equilibrium (the balance between 
supply and demand) is achieved through maximum efficiency. Efficiency 
benefits society because few resources are wasted. Market relationships 
are impersonal, anonymous, and transactional; relationships that exist are 
those between buyers and sellers. Finally, the market has power; it—not 
people—sets wages and prices.
Having identified these broad characteristics of a macro-societal market 
logic, we can now explore contingent work and overwork in preparation 
for an examination of how a macro-societal market logic is being applied 
to these trends.
CONTINGENT WORK AND OVERWORK
In the twentieth century, standard work was understood to mean fulltime 
employment—work that continued indefinitely at an employer’s place of 
business under an employer’s direction (Kalleberg, 2000). In recent years, 
non-standard employment, which includes “contingent” or “fixed-term 
contract” work, has been gaining ground in North America, Europe and Asia. 
Still, an accepted definition of contingent work remains elusive. Kalleberg 
(2000: 354) related contingent work to short-term, unstable employment and 
acknowledged its first use by economist Audrey Freedman who used the 
term to refer to work arrangements that depended on employers’ changing 
labour needs and that therefore lacked an employer-worker attachment. 
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Connelly and Gallagher (2004) identified four employment groupings
that fit the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ definition of contingent 
work as “any job in which an individual does not have an explicit or 
implicit contract for long-term employment or one in which the minimum
hours worked can vary in a nonsystematic manner”: (1) temporary help 
workers from temporary staffing agencies, (2) independent contractors 
or freelance workers, (3) direct-hire temporary workers, and (4) seasonal 
workers.
In short, contingent work is not a homogenous concept. Its prevalence 
in the workplace correspondingly depends on which definition is 
referenced. For example, in Canada, the incidence of temporary work is 
much higher than it is in the U.S. (13 percent versus 4 percent). Canada 
also has a higher rate of involuntary part-time employment compared to its 
neighbour (26 percent versus 7 percent) (Brisebois, 2003). In early 1995, as
few as 2.7 million and as many as 6 million U.S. workers were identified 
as contingent workers; these were more likely than non-contingent workers 
to be female, black, under 25 years of age, enrolled in school and employed 
in services and construction industries (Polivka, 1996). But despite this 
definitional ambiguity, Kalleberg (1995: 358) notes that “there is substantial 
agreement…that nonstandard work arrangements are associated with a lack 
of health insurance, pensions, and other fringe benefits. This is particularly 
problematic in the United States since employment is the main source of 
these benefits.” Contingent work can also lead to a loss of overall income. In 
order to make up lost wages, individuals may take multiple jobs, foregoing 
time with family, friends, and the community. In a study of the effects of 
contingent work on rural communities, Winson and Leach (2002: 178) 
reported “real signs of social disintegration, a weakening of the social fabric 
of these individuals’ lives” (emphasis in original).
The phenomenon of overwork also eludes conclusive definition, but is 
generally understood in terms of employees spending more than 40 hours 
per week on the job (Bunting, 2004) regardless of whether those hours are 
related to standard or non-standard employment. Americans work more 
hours annually than Canadians (1,821 versus 1,790 hours), and are more 
likely to work over 40 hours per week (77 percent versus 54 percent). While 
some workers undoubtedly welcome the opportunity to work more, these 
circumstances may not be entirely desirable; only 47 percent of U.S. workers 
and 40 percent of Canadian workers report being “very satisfied” with 
working conditions in their main paid job (Brisebois, 2003). In addition, 
a report on job quality indicators for the U.S., Canada, and 15 European 
countries revealed that North American workers report the highest incidence 
of working at a high speed “all the time”, which can be related to stress and 
burnout (Brisebois, 2003).
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When considered in a societal context, it becomes clear that the impact of 
both contingent work and overwork is shaped by a confluence of events that 
has restructured the larger social environment over the past few decades. The 
effects of contingent work and overwork on individuals are at least partially 
realized in work/family conflict, which occurs when work demands make it 
difficult to meet home demands or vice versa. Home demands encompass 
everything from childcare to eldercare, attention to household tasks, and 
the maintenance of friendships and spousal relationships. Overloaded 
workers who put work ahead of family often face consequences at home, 
reporting lower family satisfaction and a higher tendency to miss family 
activities because of work. This work-to-family conflict is more frequently 
experienced by men, and these workers are more likely to say that they have 
had fewer children or have remained childless because of work demands 
(Duxbury and Higgins, 2001). These workers also spend significantly less 
time in activities linked with positive parenting. On the other hand, family-
to-work conflict, which occurs when family demands such as a sick child 
or parent interfere with work demands, is more commonly experienced by 
women (Duxbury and Higgins, 2001).
In past decades, the impacts of contingent work and overwork may 
have been easier to absorb in that pressing domestic tasks tended to be 
met by women who were not in the workforce. Today, however, women 
participate in the workforce in record numbers. In 1966, 35 percent of 
married women in the U.S. worked for pay; by 1994, that figure had risen 
to 61 percent. Over the same period, the workforce participation rate for 
married women with children rose from 21 to 60 percent (Winkler, 1998), 
and as of 2000, over 75 percent of U.S. mothers with children (married or 
not) were part of the paid labour force (Council of Economic Advisors, 
2000). Regardless of marital status, in late 2002, 56 percent of American 
women were employed (Council of Economic Advisors, 2003). Of those 
women employed in 1998, 72 percent were working fulltime (Cohen and 
Bianchi, 1999); quality part-time jobs can be rare, and good wages, benefits 
and pensions are generally associated with fulltime positions. What’s more, 
as of mid 2001, almost 6 percent of all American workers held more than 
one job (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002).
With more women in the workforce, it makes sense that working 
parents have also become more common. From 1970 to 1993, dual-earner 
couples in the U.S. rose from 39 percent to 61 percent of all married couples 
(Winkler, 1998). The percentage of U.S. children living with both parents 
working fulltime year round has almost doubled, rising from 20 percent to 
37 percent (Johnson, 2000). And in 2000, single-parent families accounted 
for 10 percent of all U.S. households (Bailyn, Drago and Kochan, 2002). 
Simply put, the traditional breadwinner/homemaker model of the family, 
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where the husband works outside the home and the wife works without 
pay inside the home now accounts for less than a quarter of American 
families (Bailyn, Drago and Kochan, 2002). Furthermore, as of 1997, it was 
estimated that over 22 million U.S. households were involved in providing 
unpaid care to people aged 50 or more; by the year 2007, as many as
39 million households could be providing such care (AARP, 1997). Yet 
though most workers have family responsibilities (regardless of whether or 
not they have children), jobs continue to be designed as though someone 
is still at home to look after the domestic side of life (Bailyn, Drago and 
Kochan, 2002). Today, that simply isn’t the case.
Though work/family conflict can be expected to increase with 
overwork, in the U.S. such conflict continues to be viewed as more of an 
individual problem than an organizational one. This is so despite the fact 
that career paths are still largely aimed toward the worker who is able to 
devote forty uninterrupted years to a career (Bailyn, Drago and Kochan, 
2002). In line with this viewpoint, many companies simply do not take a 
stance on work-family issues. In 1995, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
reported that across all medium and large public companies, any type of 
flexible workplace arrangement was available to only 2 percent of workers 
(Meyer, Mukerjee and Sestero, 2001). In 1995–96, private companies fared 
only slightly better, offering childcare benefits to 4 percent of employees, 
whether through employer-managed facilities on or off the worksite, or by 
making direct payments to other care providers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
1998).
Organizations that do offer family-friendly policies tend to uphold one 
of two broad types. The first makes it easier for employees to experience 
fewer interruptions at work. Here, an employer might provide daycare, 
meals, or dry-cleaning services. The second style of family-friendly policy 
makes it easier for an employee to control work hours to accommodate 
family responsibilities. Here, workers might be allowed to telecommute, 
create flexible schedules, or take more sick days with children (Bailyn, 
Drago and Kochan, 2002). Yet several studies show that employees of 
companies with family-friendly policies often fail to make use of the 
benefits available to them (Kossek, Noe and DeMarr, 1999). Some surmise 
that a given organizational culture may not be family-friendly in spite of 
official corporate policy, as the ideal corporate worker is still thought of 
as someone who has uninterrupted hours available for work—more than 
fulltime hours in some cases. In these situations, employees may forgo 
family-friendly policies due to fears of reprisal, and evidence suggests these 
fears may be justified. Judiesch and Lyness (1999) found that U.S. workers 
who took family and medical leaves received fewer promotions and smaller 
wage increases in following years. In addition, a study conducted by the 
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Women’s Bar Association of Boston found that “while over 90 percent of 
the leading firms in the area allowed associates and partners to work part 
time, fewer than 4 percent have chosen to do so and among those who do, 
turnover is higher and about one-third report their careers have suffered for 
having taken up this option” (Bailyn, Drago and Kochan, 2002: 19).
Furthermore, some workers may not even realize what their options 
are. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act signed by President 
Clinton in 1993 mandated that corporations with 50 or more employees 
provide 12 weeks of unpaid leave to workers for family caregiving purposes. 
Yet according to Department of Labor reports, six years after the act was 
passed, over 40 percent of employees didn’t even know the act existed 
(Bailyn, Drago and Kochan, 2002). Others may be unable to take up those 
options; according to the International Labour Organization, 64 percent of 
U.S. employees with family responsibilities that required time off did not 
take unpaid leave because they couldn’t afford to do so (ILO, 2003).
If work/family issues are considered an individual problem rather than an 
organizational or social one, what are workers doing on their own initiative 
to deal with conflict caused by contingent work and overwork? Reports 
suggest that some dual-earner couples choose to become “neotraditional”: 
a working man maintains his career path while a working woman cuts back 
her hours and aspirations to devote more time to household maintenance 
and childcare (Moen and Yu, 2000). Becker and Moen (1999) reported that 
scaling back from a 60-plus hour managerial or professional workweek was 
often combined with scaling back in other areas of life: respondents reduced 
social obligations and community work, lowered personal expectations 
for housework, and limited the size of their families. Among all of the 
reasons people give for having fewer children, including religion, ideology 
and lifestyle preference (Paul, 2001), one of them continues to be “time 
famine” (Hochschild, 1997), particularly in single parent and dual-earner 
families. Moreover, the prime years of career building overlap the prime 
years of childbearing. Becker and Moen (1999) report, “A language of time 
management is being applied to the home. There is a professionalization of 
the discourse surrounding family life. The ideal family, respondents told 
us, is one of teamwork, partnership, and fairness where both partners can 
be challenged and fulfilled. This is remarkably similar to the way in which 
these managers and professionals talk about their work, emphasizing many 
of the same aspects that they value in their careers.”
Those reluctant to scale back career aspirations may join the growing 
ranks of couples in commuter marriages, where partners live apart during 
the week to pursue careers in different cities, electing to maintain their 
relationships via telephone or through weekend flights “home”. Dual-earner 
couples that find work in the same city might outsource domestic jobs such 
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as childcare, housecleaning, yard work and tax preparation in order to 
maintain work schedules, as almost all dual-earner respondents who split 
housework and childcare equally reported limited career opportunities for 
both parties (Deutsch, 1999).
Given these larger contextual changes in the social environment that 
influence workers’ experience of contingent work and overwork, we can 
now examine what characteristics of a market logic are implicit in how 
these workplace trends are understood and evaluated.
APPLYING A MARKET LOGIC TO CONTINGENT WORK 
AND OVERWORK
Macro-societal logics structure our definitions of problems and 
opportunities. A market logic defines problems or opportunities, and “good” 
and “bad” behaviour in light of its values and assumptions. As it turns 
out, a market logic is often invoked in issues related to employment. For 
example, the development of favourable psychological work environments 
is encouraged—not for mental health reasons, but because a positive 
psychological work environment results in superior organizational 
performance (Gelade and Ivery, 2003). Work/family programs are 
introduced in organizations—not in an attempt to address work/family 
conflict but in an attempt to increase organizational commitment in high 
performance workplaces (Osterman, 1995). Worker wellness programs are 
established—not because wellness is a desirable end in itself, but because 
employer medicare costs must be reduced (Green and Baker, 1991). The 
very concept of health, commonly held to have intrinsic value (“without 
your health you haven’t got anything”) has itself been re-equated to 
productivity, where healthy workers are productive workers; researchers 
in this area seek answers to such questions as “What strategic interventions 
result in changes in costs? What is the time period before savings can be 
expected…What is the optimal method of resource allocation for maximum 
results?” (Edington, 2001: 348).
In regards to contingent work and overwork, a market logic can 
paradoxically be used to argue either for or against each trend, resulting in a 
conceptual stalemate. Under a market logic, contingent work and overwork 
are organizational problems to be solved or opportunities to be seized only 
insofar as they prevent or permit organizational goals. Under a market logic, 
overwork is potentially an opportunity: more output can be realized from 
less input, and it can be less expensive for an organization to increase the 
working hours of current employees than to hire additional ones. Yet under 
a market logic, an employee is also expected to be efficient and productive 
(an argument against overwork since overwork can contribute to stress and 
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burnout, which in turn decreases organizational efficiency and productivity). 
In regards to contingent work, under a market logic waste should be 
minimized (an argument for contingent work, where slack is eliminated 
via a flexible labour force, as organizations are more flexible the less tied 
they are to a labour force; since labour represents a major organizational 
cost, that flexibility allows organizations to remain competitive in a global 
context.) A market logic therefore encourages the use of contingent workers 
as downsizing and restructuring eliminate standard jobs while presenting 
increased flexibility as an opportunity for employees; this is generally 
illustrative of conditions in the U.S. (Van Dyne and Ang, 1998).
Simply put, a market logic assimilates traditionally non-market values 
(mental health, work/family balance, worker wellness, employee health, 
etc.) in market terms, making what was once intrinsically valued a means 
to an end of competitive advantage. But a market logic is a double-edged 
sword: if we can’t make a market logic case for an important employment 
issue, does the issue become invisible? Should we not, for example, 
encourage mentally healthy work environments because of the intrinsic 
benefits of mental health, regardless of whether or not such an environment 
can be related to better organizational performance? Put another way, are 
mentally unhealthy work environments that result in superior organizational 
performance justified? Do any values other than those encompassed by a 
market logic supersede that logic?
Finally, a market logic applied to employment issues such as contingent 
work and overwork, while attractive in terms of simplified assumptions, is 
problematic for the same reason. Neoclassical economic theory concentrates 
on what should be rather than what is and has been criticized for failing to 
approximate reality (Hosseini, 1990). Granovetter (1985) suggested that a 
more solid economic stance would incorporate three classic sociological 
assumptions: (1) the pursuit of economic goals tends to be accompanied by 
the pursuit of non-economic goals; (2) economic action, similar to all action, 
is socially situated and embedded in a network of personal relations; and 
(3) economic institutions are not inevitable, but are socially constructed. 
Yet in spite of the benefits of a more solid economic stance, at the same 
time a “reliance on economics…directs attention away from questions 
about meaning, perceptions, legitimacy, power, and influence” (Kalleberg, 
1995)—questions that have traditionally been of concern to researchers.
Under a market logic, the trends of overwork and contingent work 
are defined within the framework of that logic—as individual rather than 
structural problems, and as problems of means rather than ends. Though 
choices made in the workplace reverberate through lives outside the 
workplace, a market logic can only see the individual as an individual—not 
as a member of a group. As such, a market logic views non-economic 
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impacts associated with contingent work and overwork as problems to be 
solved by that individual rather than as structural problems to be addressed 
through how we choose to organize ourselves—even though a firm’s human 
resource policies directly shape workers’ experience of contingent work 
and overwork as managers decide how to structure employment. A market 
logic therefore limits our ability to grasp, evaluate and discuss the impact 
of contingent work and overwork in non-market terms, which is exactly 
where the largest impacts may lie. Framing such issues in market logic 
terms shifts what was once intrinsically valued to something extrinsically 
valued; a market logic supplants other institutional logics as what was once 
recognized as an end in itself becomes a means to a new end. Though an 
explanation of how that process occurs is beyond the scope of this article, a 
market logic leads us to increasingly argue that what we value is important 
to the extent that it supports market logic values such as competitiveness, 
efficiency or productivity. And as Kalleberg (1995: 1211) summarizes, 
“The danger…is that when economic ideas are adopted uncritically by 
[researchers], the economic insights do not simply add a perspective to [our 
research] questions, but effectively redefine those questions…and thereby 
supplant questions previously addressed by [researchers].”
CONCLUSION
Contingent work and overwork are recognized as new realities of 
the workplace. These trends have typically been discussed in the context 
of increased capital mobility, amplified competitive pressures, and 
globalization—in short, couched within the framework of a macro-societal 
market logic. Yet the impacts of contingent work and overwork are felt outside 
the boundaries of a market logic, affected in part by the rise of women in the 
workforce, dual-career couples, the prevalence of eldercare, and a market 
logic insistence on the individual rather than the group which makes work/
family conflict an individual problem rather than a structural one.
In evaluating the trends of contingent work and overwork, a market 
logic frames what is defined as a problem or an opportunity from a market 
perspective. In a market context, both trends can be understood as problems 
or opportunities, resulting in a conceptual stalemate. Moreover, by using a 
market logic to frame and discuss contingent work and overwork, we make 
simplified assumptions about a complex reality. Yet these assumptions 
appear to shape much current analyses of work and organizations. In sum, 
economic insights are redefining the questions traditionally posed by 
researchers (Kalleberg, 1995).
In their research on contingent work, Winson and Leach (2002) call for 
scholars to deconstruct the imperatives of competitiveness and efficiency 
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in order to better examine how public discourse around workplace issues 
is shaped; this article is intended to make an initial contribution in that 
regard. Future research might attempt to verify this theoretical framework 
by empirically examining how the discourse surrounding contingent work 
and overwork has changed over time, and what the trends of contingent work 
and overwork look like outside of a market logic in terms of equality, equity 
and power, where workers are understood as group members with group 
responsibilities that cannot be ignored, and where the structural aspects of 
such trends are examined. Simply put, future research might return to a 
more sociologically-based and less economically-based approach to issues 
of the workplace.
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